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New Zealand’s (NZ’s) uptake of inverter-based solar photovoltaic energy systems can af-
fect fused protection in its 400 V low-voltage (LV) networks. This paper proposes some
basic rules that can be applied generally to avoid problems with fuse protection in such
networks. NZ’s low-voltage domestic and residential electricity distribution networks
typically follow a radial topology beyond the distribution transformer, with a multiple
earthed neutral (MEN) earthing system and individual phases connecting residences and
premises of small businesses. Most solar photovoltaic (PV) based inverter energy sys-
tems (IESs) are installed on north-facing rooftops at suburban residences. The inverters
are connected to the main supply into each installation connection point (ICP), usually
installed wherever the main circuit board is located. Electricity is exported to the distri-
bution network from behind the domestic metering equipment. Increasing PV uptake in
NZ is aecting power ows in its distribution networks [1]. New types of fault can occur
under these new conditions, in networks that were designed originally for unidirectional
power ow. As such, it is important to maintain a properly discriminated protection
scheme that ensures fuses operate as they should.
Problems with protection systems in high-voltage (>1 kV) distribution systems hosting
high penetrations of IESs have been studied in signicant depth [2]. Specic consideration
of the behaviour of fuses at the low-voltage level has been uncommon to date, and this
paper addresses the management of fuse-based protection in low-voltage networks with
high penetration of IESs. Of particular importance is the relationship between fuses and
the conductors they protect, and the purpose of developing this method is to ensure that
the phenomenon of conductor “burndown” or “burnout” can be avoided with certainty
[3].
A previous study investigated the interaction of inverter undervoltage cut-out with net-
work undervoltage due to faults [4]. It was found that the inverter’s response was depen-
dent on fault resistance, and that for moderately high fault resistances, voltages could be
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maintained above the lower threshold for inverter disconnection. As a consequence, the
possibility of fuse protection blinding could not be discounted. Because inverter under-
voltage cut-out is a secondary eect of fault conditions, the undervoltage disconnection
feature cannot be relied upon to act as a primary protection mechanism for the cable in
the event of fuse blinding. Hence some further checks are required to ensure that cables
will not carry excessive current owing to the presence of IESs in a LV network.
The rest of the introduction highlights familiar fuse protection problems. The method
formulates mitigation strategies, giving recommendations embodied in formulae that can
be used with contemporary cable fuse protection standards. The results section presents
tables derived from the method, rstly based on the theoretical limits from the standard,
and secondly based on an example fuse protection policy of one particular NZ Electricity
Distribution Business (EDB). Worked design examples are presented, before a summary
discussion of the whole approach.
1.2 LV network fuse protection
Protection in power systems is aimed at protecting equipment against damage. Almost
universally, the type of protection at the level at which IESs are connected is overcurrent
protection, and is meant to disconnect before aected equipment can overheat. Typically,
inverse denite minimum time (IDMT) overcurrent relays or fuses are used. Trip times
can be anywhere between a fraction of a second, and tens of seconds, depending on the
fault current. Low current faults are allowed to persist for some time, while high current
faults are cleared quickly. This characteristic also allows discrimination, such that the
fuse closest to the fault will trip, clearing the fault faster than fuses further away from the
fault.
In low-voltage electricity distribution networks, fuses protect cables and overhead lines
from carrying excessive current for too long. Fuses are rated to protect the conductor
while avoiding blowing under load. Overcurrent in cables and lines may damage the in-
sulation, or the conductor itself, resulting in costly replacement of sections of conductor.
With roof-top photovoltaic (PV) Inverter Energy Systems (IESs) becoming more common
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in low-voltage distribution networks, it is important that fuse protection functions prop-
erly to protect conductors in the event of a fault.
1.3 Protecting cables with fuses
This section outlines the approach to cable fused protection, explaining what is demanded
by standards to meet minimum protection criteria. AS/NZS 3008.1.2-2017 (Electrical in-
stallations - Selection of cables) Section 2.3a lays out the method for selecting a minimum
cable size based on current-carrying capacity considerations. It introduces the current
for which the circuit is designed, IB, which can be, for example, the maximum demand.
It also introduces the continuous current carrying capacity of the circuit, IZ , determined
after applying relevant de-rating factors from tables in that standard. The standard as-
serts that the design current, IB, shall be no greater than the continuous current carrying
capacity of the conductor, IZ , i.e.,
IB ≤ IZ (1)
To protect the cable from overload current, AS/NZS 3008.1.2-2017 2.3a refers to the method
outlined in AS/NZS 3000-2017 (Electrical installations - Known as the Australian/New
Zealand Wiring Rules) (AS/NZS 3000) section 2.5.3 “Protection against overload current”.
Section 2.5.3.1 introduces a nominal current for the protective device, IN , and addition-
ally the current ensuring eective operation of the protective device, I2. The AS/NZS
3000 then goes on to state the two conditions to be satised when protecting a conductor
against overcurrent as,
IB ≤ IN ≤ IZ (2)
I2 ≤ 1.45IZ (3)
In the case where a fuse acts as the protection device, I2 is the fusing current in conven-
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tional time for fuses, which is 1.6IN for fuses complying with the IEC 60269 series. To
satisfy this condition specic to fuses, equation 3 above becomes,
IB ≤ IN ≤ 0.9IZ (4)
In other words, the nominal fuse current must be less than or equal to 90 percent of the
rated cable current, and the normal load current must be less than this.
Most EDBs have their own fuse scheduling, largely based on this approach. However,
the maximum continuous current carrying capacities of cables in those schedules vary
with the installation conditions of their respective networks, e.g., due to the ambient
temperatures of surrounding air or soil. Due to this variation in scheduling, there may be
greater or lesser margin to accommodate overcurrent.
1.4 Types of protection problems arising from PV
The contribution of IESs to protection issues depends strongly on whether they keep
supplying current under fault conditions.
IESs have automated subsystems for under-voltage cut-out - activating when the network
voltage collapses, and anti-islanding, when the network disappears from the perspective
of the IES. There are two thresholds for under-voltage cut-out; 200 V (the prevailing le-
gal requirement in NZ according to the Electricity (Safety) Regulations 2010, from AS
4777.3:2005) and 180 V (from AS/NZS 4777.2:2015) [5] [6] [7]. In NZ at the time of writ-
ing, inverter energy systems must comply with AS 4777.3:2005 [8]. Clause 7.4 says that
if the system voltage goes below 200 volts for longer than a second, then the IES must
disconnect within a further one second. This gives a maximum disconnection time of
two seconds, while maintaining a minimum trip delay time of one second to allow ride-
through for brief transients. The threshold will reduce to 180V when the 2015 standard is
fully adopted.
When a fault occurs in an electricity network, a high current will ow from the source,
and the voltage on the line may or may not drop below the threshold at which IESs should
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disconnect. The amount of current contributed by an inverter rated up to 10 kVA is typ-
ically around 1.2 times the rated current output [9]. In aggregate, these inverters can
produce fault current contributions comparable to the nominal current rating of the con-
ductor [10]. The IES contribution is limited to 1.2 times the rated current for 2 seconds if
the under-voltage condition is met, otherwise the contribution will persist.
If fault currents are high and under-voltage conditions are met, the IES contribution, being
close to normal operating currents, will be relatively small. If fault currents are low,
system studies show that under-voltage conditions will not be met, and the persisting IES
current contribution can lead to two issues. At the electricity distribution level, these two
issues are sympathetic tripping, and protection blinding.
1.4.1 Sympathetic tripping
Sympathetic tripping is unwanted disconnection of generation on healthy feeders, as a
consequence of a fault on a nearby feeder. This has three sub-categories:
1. When the unwanted disconnection is via a fuse blowing or overcurrent relay opera-
tion, as shown in Figure 1a. This sort of disconnection requires human intervention
to restore power.
2. When there is an unwanted operation of a protection device (i.e. a fuse blowing)
downstream of a fault on a feeder. While this does not result in more customers be-
ing disconnected, it does make the fault recovery more complicated. This situation
is shown in Figure 1b.
3. When distributed generation on healthy feeders is disconnected due to abnormal
voltage conditions. This type of disconnection is automatically restored when volt-

























(b) F2 blows before F1
Figure 1: Two causes of sympathetic tripping in LV networks
1.4.2 Protection blinding
Also known as protection under-reach, this is dened as when distributed generation on a
faulted feeder provides a high enough proportion of the fault current that the appropriate
feeder fuse does not clear a fault, and part of the faulted feeder carries a current that could
damage the feeder. For this to occur, two conditions must be met. Firstly, the voltage at
the IESs on the faulted feeder must remain at or above the minimum voltage threshold
(200 or 180 volts), such that they remain connected and contributing to the fault current.
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Secondly, the current ow at the fault must be high enough that the cable is likely to be
damaged. The fault resistance has two bounds - an upper bound above which currents
(including the IES contribution) are insuciently high to damage the cable, and a lower
bound, below which fuse protection operates (even though IESs contribute to the fault
current). IESs may disconnect due to under-voltage, but it is dependent on the under-
voltage condition being reached, and so the worst-case current contribution may not be




















Figure 2: Fuse blinding, where the current through F1 is less than the current
through the fault
1.5 Previous work
Previous studies have identied sympathetic tripping as a problem that can be caused
by increased IES penetration [11] [12]. The same studies identied fuse blinding as an-
other problem, but did not suggest ways of assessing and mitigating the potential for fuse
blinding when signicant numbers of IESs are installed on LV feeders. In the next section,
two basic rules are described that eliminate sympathetic tripping, and minimise problems
arising due to fuse blinding.
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2 Method
2.1 Minimising and eliminating protection problems
Electrical networks are constrained by voltage limits and current carrying capacity. As
far as LV protection systems are concerned, it is a cable’s current carrying capacity that
determines the upper limit of its allowable over-current. Any current carrying capacity
between a circuit’s design current, IB and its maximum continuous capacity, IZ , can be
viewed as Extra Current Capacity, or simply, ECC, which can be exploited to work out
how much additional IES-sourced current can be accommodated, whilst avoiding prob-
lems with protection systems.
Hosting capacity describes how many kilowatts of distributed generation can be accom-
modated on a LV network. Hosting capacities in LV networks are usually found based
on constraints of voltage and current [13], but only in a way that addresses the question
of what can be accommodated on a network within voltage and current limits, without
consideration of constraints aorded by protection systems.
Since these existing ideas about hosting capacities are already established in the literature,
it makes sense to introduce the notion of a Protection-Based Hosting Capacity (PBHC),
as distinct from existing denitions of hosting capacity. We propose that ECC can be
quantied from rst principles using existing network protection design rules, in such a
way that PBHC can be easily determined. PBHC can be found for any network where
cable and fuse sizes are known, thus avoiding any instance of sympathetic tripping and
mitigating the eects of fuse-blinding. In this method, two rules are identied that can be
used to determine how much ECC there is available in a network, and what the PBHC is.
PBHC in this method is always calculated at 100 % penetration of DG on the low-voltage
network.
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2.2 To avoid sympathetic tripping
Avoiding sympathetic tripping of the rst two kinds described in Section 1.4.1 requires
that the aected fuse (F2 in Figures 1a and 1b) does not blow at the level of fault current
that the IES can provide through that fuse (less the current consumed by the ICP loads).
Given that this current is just 1.2 times the IES rating, a sensible fuse rating would be
higher than this current. This leads to the following recommendation:
Recommendation 1 (R1): All fuses should be rated at greater than 1.2 times the com-
bined nominal current output rating of downstream connected IESs.
This can be written as,
IN ≥ 1.2IK (5)
where IK is the combined nominal output current rating of downstream connected IESs.
2.3 To mitigate the eects of protection blinding
It is possible that cable current at the end of the feeder may exceed fuse rated current by
up to 1.2 times the maximum combined rating of IESs on each particular single phase of
that feeder. Therefore:
Recommendation 2 (R2): Fuses should be rated no greater than the cable rating minus
1.2 times the combined IES current ratings on the protected feeder.
The worst-case unmitigated fault current, IF , due to fuse blinding that can ow in a con-
ductor is simply nominal current rating of the upstream fuse, IN , plus the sum of IES fault
currents, 1.2IK ,
IF ≤ IN + 1.2IK . (6)
The current at the fault should be less than the maximum current carrying capacity of
the cable, thus,
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IF ≤ IZ (7)
with inequality 6 implying
IN ≤ IZ − 1.2IK (8)
which embodies Recommendation 2.
2.4 A general method for using extra current capacity to avoid fuse pro-
tection problems
It is practical to determine how many volt-amperes (VAs) of IES can be installed down-
stream of a fuse in an LV feeder, while avoiding fuse protection problems. The rated
current of all the IESs on a single phase is the total nominal VA rating of those systems,










Recommendation 2 can be re-stated by rearranging equation 8 to give
1.2IK ≤ IZ − IN (11)
which simply states that the sum of fault currents due to IESs downstream of the fuse
shall be no greater than the continuous current carrying capacity of the conductor minus
the fuse nominal current.
Equations 5 and 11 can be combined to give,
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SK ≤
(IZ − IN ) × Un
1.2
. (12)
The maximum total IES VA rating allowed on a single phase is therefore the minimum of










where SK has been replaced by Hmax to denote the maximum allowable total IES power
on a single phase.
This denition is purely a function of a fuse’s nominal current IN , and the cable’s maxi-
mum continuous current carrying capacity. This denition can be used directly in con-
junction with the AS/NZS 3008.1.2-2017, where IZ corresponds to the de-rated value of
cable current carrying capacity.
3 Results
3.1 Tables derived from AS/NZS 3008.1.2-2017
Equation 13 is signicant because it enables the population of tables for various combina-
tions of cable sizes and fuse sizes that show the per-phase Hmax for a feeder downstream
of a fuse, so that neither fuse sympathetic tripping can occur, nor can fuse blinding en-
danger cables. This is done for the case of both copper and aluminium three or four core
cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) insulated cables, buried direct, whose current carrying
capacities are found in AS/NZS 3008.1.2:2017 Table 14, columns 23 and 24, respectively.
It should be noted that IZ has not been thermally re-rated, and that it is a requirement
of the standard to adjust the rating depending on installation conditions, as per AS/NZS
3008.1.2:2017 section 2.3 clause (d). Hmax for copper conductor cables are shown in Table 1,
while those for aluminium conductor cables are shown in Table 2.
Hmax is given on a per phase basis, as a single fuse protects a single phase of a feeder. All
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the tables presented in this document have been calculated with the phase-neutral voltage
Un = 230 V. Where dashes appear in the tables, it means that the inequality in equation 4
has been violated, meaning those values are unacceptable for a normal protection design.
Table 1: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVAper phase, for copper
conductor cables, three or four core, XLPE insulated and buried direct. Based on
AS/NZS 3008.1.2:2017 Table 14, column 23.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Copper 63 100 125 160 200 250 315 355 400 500
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
16 118 10.5 3.5 - - - - - - - -
25 153 12.1 10.2 5.4 - - - - - - -
35 184 12.1 16.1 11.3 4.6 - - - - - -
50 218 12.1 19.2 17.8 11.1 - - - - - -
70 269 12.1 19.2 24.0 20.9 13.2 - - - - -
95 323 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 23.6 14.0 - - - -
120 368 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 32.2 22.6 10.2 - - -
150 412 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 31.1 18.6 10.9 - -
185 465 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 41.2 28.8 21.1 12.5 -
240 539 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 47.9 42.9 35.3 26.6 -
300 607 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 47.9 56.0 48.3 39.7 20.5
400 685 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 47.9 60.4 63.3 54.6 35.5
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Table 2: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kW per phase, for alu-
minium conductor cables, three or four core, XLPE insulated and buried direct.
Based on AS/NZS 3008.1.2:2017 Table 14, column 24.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Aluminium 63 100 125 160 200 250 315 355 400
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
16 91 5.4 - - - - - - - -
25 119 10.7 3.6 - - - - - - -
35 142 12.1 8.1 3.3 - - - - - -
50 170 12.1 13.4 8.6 - - - - - -
70 209 12.1 19.2 16.1 9.4 - - - - -
95 250 12.1 19.2 24.0 17.3 9.6 - - - -
120 286 12.1 19.2 24.0 24.2 16.5 6.9 - - -
150 320 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 23 13.4 - - -
185 364 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 31.4 21.9 9.4 0 0
240 423 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 33.2 20.7 13.0 0
300 477 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 43.5 31.1 23.4 14.8
400 546 12.1 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 47.9 44.3 36.6 28.0
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3.2 Tables derived from a NZ local electricity distribution utility
The following tables were derived from the cable and fuse combination policy of an NZ
electricity distribution utility. The key dierence is a much more conservative cable cur-
rent rating IZ , which signicantly restricts the hosting capacity. Of note is the signicant
variation in available capacity for hosting IESs compared to the capacities derived from
standards in Tables 1 and 2. This is mostly due to the restricted variety of cables and
fuse sizes; some combinations have signicantly diminished hosting capacity compared
to others. For this series of tables, there is also the trend that copper conductors appear
to have more hosting capacity than aluminium conductors for the same fuse ratings.
Table 3: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVAper phase, for copper
conductor cables, four core, XLPE insulated and buried direct. Based on fuse
protection policy from a NZ electricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Cu XLPE buried 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 179 15.1 10.4 3.6 - - -
95 215 19.2 17.3 10.5 - - -
120 244 19.2 22.8 16.1 8.4 - -
185 309 19.2 24.0 28.6 20.9 11.3 -
300 403 19.2 24.0 30.7 38.3 29.3 16.9
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Table 4: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVA per phase, for alu-
minium conductor cables, four core, XLPE insulated and buried direct. Based on
fuse protection policy from a NZ electricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Al XLPE buried 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 140 7.7 2.9 - - - -
95 167 12.8 8.1 - - - -
120 192 17.6 12.8 6.1 - - -
185 249 19.2 23.8 17.1 9.4 - -
300 365 19.2 24.0 30.7 31.6 22.0 9.6
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3.3 Worked examples
3.3.1 Example 1: Assessment of an existing network
A feeder is composed of a 185 mm2 buried aluminium XLPE cable, with 9 ICPs per phase, and
a 160 A fuse protecting the cable. What is the maximum IES size per ICP that can be hosted
on the feeder at 100 % penetration, without aecting fuse performance?
From Table 2, Hmax is 30.7 kVA. Since the number of ICPs on the feeder is 9, then the
maximum permissible IES size at each ICP is,
30.7 kW
9 ICPs = 3.4 kVA. (14)
3.3.2 Example 2: Design of a new network
A new subdivision consisting of 45 ICPs is to be built. A covenant species each ICP will have
2 kW PV IES systems connected. A colleague’s modelling suggests the peak load will average
to 4.9 kW at each ICP. From Table 1, nd the cable and fuse combination for the job.
On a per-phase basis, the peak current for the subdivision will be,
15 ICPs × 4.9 kW
230 V = 320 A, (15)
So a suitable fuse size will be 355 A. The total IES power rating for the feeder will be,
15 ICPs × 2 kW = 30 kW. (16)
Looking at Table 1, the smallest cable size for a 355 A fuse that will accommodate the
30 kW of IES power is a 240 mm2 Cu cable.
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4 Conclusion
It is shown how fuse coordination can be preserved in LV networks with high penetra-
tions of IES, so that cables are still protected. Recommendations are made to help combat
sympathetic tripping and blinding of fuse protection systems. In particular, sympathetic
tripping can be avoided if fuses are rated greater than 1.2 times the combined nominal
current output rating of downstream connected IESs. In addition, to mitigate eects of
protection-blinding, fuses should be rated no greater than the cable rating minus 1.2 times
the combined IES current ratings on the protected feeder. Equations were derived that em-
bodied these recommendations, and tables were drawn up to show the available hosting
capacity for various combinations of fuses and cable sizes. Lastly, some design examples
were given to show the methodology working in practice.
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5 Appendix A: Further tables
Table 5: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVAper phase, for copper
conductor cables, four core, XLPE insulated and ducted. Based on fuse protection
policy from a NZ electricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Cu XLPE ducted 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 165 12.5 7.7 - - - -
95 199 19.0 14.2 7.5 - - -
120 231 19.2 20.3 13.6 5.9 - -
185 297 19.2 24.0 26.3 18.6 9.0 -
300 396 19.2 24.0 30.7 37.6 28.0 15.5
Table 6: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVA per phase, for cop-
per conductor cables, four core, PVC insulated and buried direct. Based on fuse
protection policy from a NZ electricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Cu PVC buried 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 160 11.5 6.7 - - - -
95 192 17.6 12.8 6.1 - - -
120 219 19.2 18.0 11.3 - - -
185 277 19.2 24.0 22.4 14.8 - -
300 360 19.2 24.0 30.7 30.7 21.1 8.6
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Table 7: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVAper phase, for copper
conductor cables, four core, PVC insulated and ducted. Based on fuse protection
policy from a NZ electricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Cu PVC ducted 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 149 9.4 4.6 - - - -
95 183 15.9 11.1 4.4 - - -
120 208 19.2 15.9 9.2 - - -
185 267 19.2 24.0 20.5 12.8 - -
300 354 19.2 24.0 30.7 29.5 19.9 7.5
Table 8: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVA per phase, for alu-
minium conductor cables, four core, XLPE insulated and ducted. Based on fuse
protection policy from a NZ electricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Al XLPE ducted 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 129 5.6 - - - - -
95 155 10.5 5.8 - - - -
120 181 15.5 10.7 4.0 - - -
185 233 19.2 20.7 14.0 6.3 - -
300 314 19.2 24.0 29.5 21.9 12.3 -
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Table 9: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVA per phase, four core,
PVC insulated and buried direct. Based on fuse protection policy from a NZ elec-
tricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Al PVC buried 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 124 4.6 - - - - -
95 149 9.4 4.6 - - - -
120 153 10.2 5.4 - - - -
185 196 18.4 13.6 6.9 - - -
300 283 19.2 24.0 23.6 15.9 6.3 -
Table 10: Feeder single-phase hosting capacity (Hmax), in kVA per phase, for alu-
minium conductor cables, four core, PVC insulated and ducted. Based on fuse
protection policy from a NZ electricity distribution utility.
Cable Fuse rating IN (A)
Al PVC ducted 100 125 160 200 250 315
Size (mm2) IZ (A) Feeder Hmax (kVA per phase)
70 115 2.9 - - - - -
95 140 7.7 2.9 - - - -
120 160 11.5 6.7 - - - -
185 206 19.2 15.5 8.8 - - -
300 277 19.2 24.0 22.4 14.8 - -
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